

ROLL CALL

- Lieutenant Collins
- Supervisor Connelly
- Supervisor Conant
- Secretary Crowfoot
- Deputy Director Curry
- Supervisor Flores
- Supervisor Fuhrer
- Assemblyman Gallagher
- Supervisor Kimmelshue

- Deputy Licon
- Captain Million
- Director Nemeth
- Senator Nielsen
- Councilmember Pittman
- Mayor Reynolds
- Lieutenant Stokes
- Superintendent Teague
- Supervisor Vasquez
- Genoa Widener

ITEM 1: WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS

ITEM 2: ACTION ITEMS & ROADMAPS

Commission Action Items Tracker

	Item	Meeting	Status
1	Tour of Joint Operations Center (State-Federal Flood Operations Center in Sacramento)	Mtg 2 11/2019	On hold due to Covid-19. Aiming for Q2 2022.
2	Report out how instrumentation performed and was managed during winter operations	Mtg 2 11/2019	Ongoing.
3	Invite State Water Contractors to future meeting(s)	Mtg 2 11/2019	On track. Invite for Q3 2021 meeting.
4	Provide regular updates and milestones developments from DWR on Forecast-Informed Reservoir Operations (FIRO) as well as Oroville and New Bullards Bar water control manual processes	Mtg 3 02/2020	On track. Update planned for Q4 2021 meeting.
5	Follow-up on the status of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) relicensing	Mtg 3 02/2020	Ongoing. Anticipate early 2022 update.

Commission Action Items Tracker

	ltem	Meeting	Status
6	Follow-up on the status of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reimbursement for spillway reconstruction	Mtg 3 02/2020	Ongoing.
7	Discussion to help state agencies and local partners address homelessness concern around Feather River.	Mtg 3 02/2020	For future Commission consideration.
8	CalOES follow up with CalTrans on the status of their post-fire mitigation along County highways	Mtg 5 11/2020	Done. Work confirmed complete.
9	DWR updates on debris and storm inflows	Mtg 5 11/2020	DWR monitoring, will notify Commission as needed.
10	DWR follow-up re: Hyatt Power Plant	Mtg 5 11/2020	Done. Update provided at Q2 2021 meeting.

Commission Action Items Tracker

	ltem	Meeting	Status
11	Offer new members, Kimmelshue, Fuhrer and Vasquez, a Commissioner orientation.	Mtg 6 2/19/21	On track.
12	Post additional contact information on OCAC website.	Mtg 6 2/19/21	Done. Contact e-mail and phone # are available on Commission website.
13	Agendize discussion on lessons learned from 1986 and 1987 water events.	Mtg 6 2/19/21	On track. Update planned for Q4 2021.

2021 Public Meeting Agenda Roadmap

Q3 (August 27, 2021) Infrastructure

Topics

Planned Major Projects at Oroville Facilities

- Asset Management
- Annual Maintenance Plan

Status Updates

Commission Report

Q4 (December 3, 2021) Operations

Topics

Oroville Dam Facility Operations

- Winter Operations Plan
- U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (water control manual update)

Status Updates

Commission Report Wildfire Season Update

2022 Public Meeting Agenda Roadmap

Q1 (2022) Partnerships

Topics

Dam Facility Partnerships

- FERC Relicensing
- Recreation Partnerships
- Public Safety Partnerships

Status Updates

Commission Report

Q2 (2022) Joint Operations Center – Sacramento

Topics

Joint Operations Center

- Tour of Joint Operations Center (Commissioner only portion)
- Overview of Joint Ops and Flood Ops
- 2017 Lessons Learned and Current Procedures

Status Updates


Commission Report

Commission Report Senate Bill 955 Requirements

SB 955 states the Commission will publish a report at least **once every three years** that provides the following:

- An overview of ongoing maintenance and improvements made at the Dam and Dam complex;
- A register of communications received from State Agencies and other parties to the Commission;
- Notice of upcoming plans made by State Agencies for the Dam and Dam Complex; and
- An overview of flood management projects on the Feather River affecting public safety and flood risk reduction.

Commission Report Development Timeline



ITEM 3: DAM SAFETY PROGRAM: REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE

California's Dam Safety Program






Sharon K. Tapia, P.E., PMP

Dam Safety Authorities

California Water Code
Division 3. Dams and Reservoirs
Part 1. Supervision of Dams and Reservoirs

California Code of Regulations
Title 23. Waters
Division 2. Department of Water Resources
Chapter 1. Dams and Reservoirs





Recent Dam Safety Initiatives & Legislation

Dam Safety Initiatives:
-Proposed Legislation for
Emergency Action Plans
-Directed Expedited Reviews
of Spillways

-Inspection Frequencies and Requirements-Independent Review of DSOD's Dam Safety Protocols Feb 24, 2017

Jun 27, 2017

Governor's 4-Point Plan to Bolster Dam Safety and Flood Protection

Senate Bill 92

- -Hazard Potential Classification Update
- -Inundation Maps*
- -Emergency Action Plans
- -Bolstered Enforcement*
- -Amended Annual Dam Fees*

Assembly Bill 1270

Assembly Bill 2516


-Public Reporting of Information Related to Dams with Reservoir Restrictions


Feb 26, 2018

Sep 19, 2018




Hazard Classifications and Dam Owners








DSOD & O&M within DWR







DSOD's Staffing








Design Reviews & Re-evaluations













Construction Oversight












Inspections & Surveillance Monitoring







Emergency Response





Source: CBS Local San Francisco







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CA_DWR



calwater



cadepartmentofwaterresources



ITEM 4: DAM SAFETY PROGRAM: PUBLIC SAFETY PERSPECTIVE

State Water Project Dam Safety Program



Castaic Dam - High Outlet Tower and Access Bridge, Los Angeles County

Oroville Citizens Advisory Commission May 28, 2021

Presented by:
David Sarkisian, PE, CEG
Chief of Dam Safety Services
SWP Chief Dam Safety Engineer

26 State Water Project Dams

Field Division	Dam				
	Oroville Dam				
	Parish Camp Saddle Dam				
	Bidwell Bar Canyon Saddle Dam				
	Thermalito Diversion Dam				
Orovillo	Thermalito Forebay Dam				
Oroville	Thermalito Afterbay Dam				
	Feather River Fish Barrier Dam				
	Antelope Dam				
	Frenchman Dam				
	Grizzly Valley Dam				
	Bethany Dams				
	Clifton Court Forebay Dam				
Delta	Del Valle Dam				
	Patterson Dam				
	Dyer Dam				
	O'Neill Forebay Dam				
San Luis	Sisk Dam (San Luis Reservoir)				
San Luis	Little Panoche Detention Dam				
	Los Banos Dam				
	Pyramid Dam				
	Quail Dam				
	Castaic Dam				
Southern	Devils Canyon Second Afterbay				
	Cedar Springs Dam				
	Crafton Hills Dam				
	Perris Dam				



Focus for Typical Industry Dam Safety Program – Pre-2000


- Surveillance & Inspections
- Dam Safety Assessments
- Reservoir Operations
- Maintenance
- Design and Construction
- Emergency Action Plans
- Independent Reviews



B. F. Sisk Dam (San Luis Reservoir) Glory Hole Spillway and Gianelli Pumping-Generating Plant Intake Structure

2017-2018 SWP Dam Safety Program Reviews

- Independent Forensic Team Report
- Owner's Dam Safety Program Audit
- ISO 55000/ASDSO Peer Review
- Management Reviews/Visits with Peers
- Dam Safety Program Maturity Matrices



Common Areas Identified for Improvement

- Update the SWP Dam Safety Policy
- Define the Top-down structure
- Increase training and interaction with dam safety organizations
- Implement Cross-Divisional Dam Safety Teams
- Link the SWP Dam Safety Program to the O&M Asset Management Program
- Improve Culture of Continuous Improvement

Road-mapping of Multi-year Dam Safety Program Initiatives

30 initiatives or "tasks" identified



Consolidated to 16 Initiatives

- Solidify Guiding Documents
- Functional Design Implementation
- Dam-Specific Asset Management Plans
- Risk Management
- Maintenance Management
- Data and Document Management
- Emergency Preparedness
- Core Competencies

- Outsourcing Strategy
- Business Processes
- Resource Requirements
- Training Program
- Industry Outreach
- Communication and Change Management
- Performance Metrics
- Program Reviews



Initiative No. 1 – Solidify Guiding Documents, Including the SWP Dam Safety Program Document

- Updated Policy Signed by Director on November 2, 2018
- Public safety is the highest priority for the Department and the SWP
- Assigns responsibilities and accountability to key positions
- Formally Established Program





be environment in a online endowing habit calley is the highest priority for the Deserthern in the management and operation of the State State Project (SWF), which is usually as a special of the State State Project (SWF), which is usually as a second of the State naintains clear protects, arrong Department securitives, employees, and SVM staceholders for the identification electricistics, management, and communication of any SWP some arrivey risks.

the SAP Elam Safety Program, SAP managers will may have a culture that oncreate the SAP dam safety oring ples. The

Roles and Responsibilities of SWP Dam Safety

The SWP Dam Salvey Program relies on commitment and engagement from all lends of the Digier ment.

1. Amorronae versus in nected to refer hones or perceived comparing issues to the Chief Dain Safety Engineer for publications

- Establishing, communicating and main aining SWF. polic en percining to dom categy to emphasize the importance of public sales;
- Ensuring that resources are properly aligned and sufficient to address public acting priorities for SWI
- dams and associated inhastructure, and successful. nanoution of the SWP Dam Safety Program. Communicating significant demissibility issues to the Disputy Director, State Water Project, and the Director.
- 4 Engaging the Chief Deni Sarety Engineer, SAF Division Chiefs, Denuty Directors and Director on program performance
- activities to a listake to dem.

The Chief Dam Safety Engineer is responsible for:

- improving the SWF Dam Salety Program. This includes resintaining the 50% Demonstrates from the first program (ODSP) document which demons roles, responsible testing and 50% Dani Sefety Region or energy.
- 2. Prioritizing demisalety projects and activities in
- 1. Communicating significant data safety issues and risk reduction measures in a timely manner to the Assistant Deputy Christon, State Water Project, and the Reputy Director, State Plate: Project.

SWP Division Chiefs support the SWP Dam Safety

- 1. Alicenino resources to address program priorities as and approved by the Assistant Deputy Director, State.
- 2. Developing and implementing effective procedures the program elements.
- 3. Developing and implementing pest practices in the design, construction operation, and maintenance of SWF dome and their apparatements.
- 4. Part diparting in the SMM Jam Safety frequent Stooring

SWP Dam Safety Program Elements

- Surveillance To be detection, respections, instruments or monitoring, and texting with rubust citra collection and analyzes.
- Dem Safety Assessments "volure in facility performance and design, considering modern state and analysis methodologies. "Inform comprehensive facility toy ows.
- · Maintenance Meet or exceed industry standards for maintainment of SWP name and approximates.
- Design and Construction Employ constructed design and construction practices in accordance with regulatory requirements and modern inductry standards
- Emergency Proparedness Maintain and energise Emergency Action 7 bits and Sicquity Plans; pattern with emergency management agencies and
- · Independent Reviews Conduct facility ravious by expensal dam scretz expension cough Port 120 independent Consultants, Director's Sofiety Review Soords, and Beards of Consultants ated so, obtain preferences, lower to and day unlane
- . Communication. Communicate and recommenders safet requestance program status to internal and external interests and external
- · Documentation. Organiza and socure program and
- 'activy documentation . Technical Expertise - Hire, train, and develop quarted
- stell through documented mining programs and partnering with external expense.
- Program Reviews Monitor program performance mentionand performings or auditor indifferent management to promote continue improvement.

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SWP Dam Safety Program Elements

- Surveillance
- Dam Safety Assessments
- Reservoir Operations
- Maintenance
- Design and Construction
- Risk Management

- Emergency Preparedness
- Independent Reviews
- Project Delivery
- Communication
- Documentation
- Technical Expertise
- Program Reviews



Initiative No. 2 – Complete SWP Dam Safety Program Functional Design

Implementation Chief Dam Safety Engineer Dam Safety **Branch Chief** Maintenanc North South Risk Program Surveillance Surveillance and Project Managemen t and EAP Managemen and Facility and Facility Delivery Central South North Performanc Performanc Branch Branch t and Section Section Section e Branch e Branch **Standards** Branch CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF **VATER RESOURCES**

Initiative No. 4 – Enhance DWR's Approach to Dam Safety-related Risk Management

DWR Division of Operations and Maintenance Risk Matrix

Likelil			DMD Division of Operations 9 Maintenance Disk Matrix								
Likelii	nood	_	DWR Division of Operations & Maintenance Risk Matrix								
Likely to occur		7	7	7 14		28	35	42	49		
		6	6	12	18	24	30	36	42		
Likely to occur within 3 years	< 1x10 ⁰ to 3.3x10 ⁻¹	5.5	5.5	11	16.5	22	27.5	35	38.5		
Likely to occur within 10 years	< 3.3x10 ⁻¹ to 1x10 ⁻¹	5	5	10	15	20	25	30	35		
Likely to occur within 30 years	< 1x10 ⁻¹ to 3.3x10 ⁻²	4.5	4.5	9	13.5	18	22.5	26	31.5		
Likely to occur sithin 100 years 43.3x10 ⁻² to 1x10 ⁻² 4		4	4	8	12	16	20	24	28		
Likely to occur within 1000 years < 1x10 ⁻² to 1x10 ⁻³ 3		3	3	6	9	12	15	18	21		
Likely to occur		2	2	4	6	-	10	12	14		
Likely to occur within 100,000 years < 1x10 ⁻⁴ or greater		1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
			Consequence								
Consequence Category Public Safety			1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
			Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	High	Major	Extreme	Catastrophic		
			No injury	Near miss Or minor	Minor injuries not requiring medical attention	Single injury requiring medical attention	Multiple injuries or permanent disability	Fatality Or major property	Multiple Fatalities		
			public or private property	property damage				damage over large area	ver		

Oroville Dam Comprehensive Needs Assessment: *Risk* Assessment plus Risk Reduction Measures




Level 2 Risk Analyses

- ✓ Oroville Dam
- ✓ Pyramid Dam
- √ Castaic Dam

	Likelihood			State Water Project Dam Safety Risk Matrix									
	Likely to occur 10 times a year			10	DWR C	D&M Risk Ma	trix (AM 0	2 01)	60	70	80	90	100
	Likely to occur within 1 year	1X10°	9	9	18	27	36	45	54	63	72	81	90
	Likely to occur within 3 years	< 1x10° to 3.3x10 ⁻¹	8.5	8.5	17	25.5	34	42.5	51	59.5	68	76.5	85
	Likely to occur within 10 years	< 3.3x10 ⁻¹ to 1x10 ⁻¹	8	8	16	24	32	40	48	56	64	72	80
-	Likely to occur with 1-30 years	< 1x10 ⁻¹ to 3.3x10 ⁻²	7.5	7.5	15	22.5	30	37.5	45	52.5	60	67.5	75
	Likely to occur within 100 years	< 5.0×10 ⁻² to 1×10 ⁻²		7	14	21	28	35	42	49	56	63	70
	Likely to occur within 1,000 years	< 1x10 ⁻² to 1x10 ⁻³	6	6	12	18	24	30	36	42	48	54	60
	Likely to occur within 10,000 years	< 1x10 ⁻³ to 1x10 ⁻⁴	5	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50
	Likely to occur within 100,000 years	< 1x10 ⁻⁴ to 1x10 ⁻⁵	4	4	8	12	16	20	24	28	32	36	40
	Likely to occur within 1,000,000 years	< 1x10 ⁻⁵ to 1x10 ⁻⁶	3	3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27	30
	Likely to occur within 10,000,000 years	< 1x10 ⁻⁶ to 1x10 ⁻⁷	2	2	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20
	Likely to occur less often than 10,000,000 years	< 1x10 ⁻⁷	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
								Consequence					
	Consequence Category Public Safety			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
				No injury No damage to public or private property	Near miss Or minor property damage	Minor injuries not requiring medical attention Or moderate property damage	Single injury requiring medical attention Or moderate property damage over large area	Multiple injuries or permanent disability Or major property damage	Fatality 0 - 1 Or major property damage over large area	Multiple Fatalities 1 - 10	Multiple Fatalities 10 - 100	Multiple Fatalities 100 – 1,000	Multiple Fatalities >1,000

Initiative No. 7 – Enhance Emergency Preparedness

- Dam Breach Inundation Map Web Publisher (ca.gov)
- Emergency Action Plans (EAPs)
- Virtual Annual EAP Seminars
- Tabletop and Functional EAP Exercises
- Internal Rapid Response and Recovery Plans




Fair Weather Failure Inundation Map for Bidwell Bar Canyon Saddle Dam, Butte County



Initiative No. 8 – Identify DSP-related Core Competencies

- Identified the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for successful execution of job duties within O&M Dam Safety Services.
- Utilized the US Dept. of Labor Engineering Competency model
- Multiple Tiers of competencies
- Challenges of Tier 5 competencies






Initiative No. 12 – Formalize and Expand Dam Safety

Program Training

Particle Sources

Particle Sour

- ✓ Established Training Plans to require development of dam safety core competencies
- ✓ Training Contracts
- ✓ Developed SWP Dam Safety Awareness Modules 1A and 1B
- ✓ Developing Field Divisionspecific Dam Safety Training Modules





Initiative No. 13 – Enhance Industry


Outreach

- Increased collaboration with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation
- Increased dam safety conference and workshop attendance.
- Participation in CEATI Dam Safety Interest Group.





Initiative No. 14 – Develop DSP Management of Change Program and Communication Plan



- Early Implementation Projects
- Future Dam Safety Projects
- Emergency Action Plan-related Activities
- Inspection & Surveillance Activities (multiple responsible parties)
- Maintenance Activities
- Operational Activities
- Seasonal Forecasting
- Dam Safety Program Enhancements



Initiative No. 16 – Develop More Formal Dam Safety Program Management Review

- Bi-weekly SWP Dam Safety Program Steering Committee Meetings
- Quarterly meetings with FERC and DSOD
- Independent Verification & Validation
- Annual Program Reporting
- 5-year Program Review/Audit



Thank you



ITEM 5: RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk Management in Socio-Technical Systems Comments from Oroville Dam CNA Process

Dr. R. Storesund, PE., GE, Consulting Engineer, Storesund Consulting
American Society of Civil Engineers, Region 9 Governor — San Francisco Section
Executive Director, UC Berkeley's Center for Catastrophic Risk Management
President & CEO, NextGen Mapping, Inc. (Software Development)
President & CEO, Storesund Construction, Inc. (Class A, B, C-57)
President & Director, SafeR³ (Non-Profit)





About Rune

- Dual Degree Program UC Santa Cruz/UC Berkeley
 - BA Anthropology (UC Santa Cruz)
 - BS Civil Engineering (UC Berkeley)
- Masters in Geotechnical Engineering (UC Berkeley)
- Doctorate in Civil Systems (UC Berkeley)



- Consulting Engineer, Storesund Consulting
- President & CEO, NextGen Mapping, Inc. (Software Development)
- President & CEO, Storesund Construction, Inc. (Class A, B, C-57)
- President & Director, SafeR³ (Non-Profit)















My Disaster Research

- 1986 NASA Challenger
- 2003 NASA Columbia
- 2005 Hurricane Katrina
- 2010 San Bruno PGE Explosion
- 2010 Deepwater Horizon
- 2014 Oso Landslide (WA State)
- 2015 Aliso Canyon Gas Leak
- 2017 Oroville Dam Spillway Failure
- 2017 US Navy Ship Collisions
- 2018 California Wildfires (Butte County)
- 2019 Brumadinho Landslide
- 2019 Boeing 737 MAX
- 2020 Michigan Dam Failures












Oroville Dam CNA Ad Hoc

- Served at the invitation of Senator Nielsen and Assemblyman Gallagher
- Risk Management Perspective
- Ad Hoc: July 2018 to December 2020
- May 10, 2021 Report with Reflections and Recommendations

http://safer3.world/



Community "Safety" Following Comprehensive Study - Oroville Dam

May 10, 2021











What I'd like to Talk About Today

- What is risk & crisis
- Socio-Technical Systems (people and organizations too!)
- Understanding utility of "uncertainty" as a management variable
- Setting performance expectations ("Expected" performance)
- Use of "Leading Indicators"
- Tracking skew between "Work as Imagined" and "Work as Done"
- Advanced Inquiry Methods (Dialectic, Multiple Realities, etc.)
- Focus on "Valid" and "Reliable" methods
- Avoiding E3 Errors (solving the wrong problem precisely)
- Triangulation approaches to overcome conflicting/mixed signals
- Safety Culture and Process Improvement Programs



What I Can Talk About in 20 Minutes

- What is risk & crisis
- Socio-Technical Systems (people and organizations too!)
- Understanding utility of "uncertainty" as a management variable
- Setting performance expectations ("Expected" performance)
- Use of "Leading Indicators"
- Tracking skew between "Work as Imagined" and "Work as Done"
- Advanced Inquiry Methods (Dialectic, Multiple Realities, etc.)
- Focus on "Valid" and "Reliable" methods
- Avoiding £3 Errors (solving the wrong problem precisely)
- Triangulation approaches to overcome conflicting/mixed signals
- Safety Culture and Process Improvement Programs



Safety

- Searching for "safety"
- DWR wants to ensure safety
- Community wants to feel safe







Risk Perception – Insurance

"Regarding dams and private insurance. My understanding, which I confirmed, is that private insurers are not insuring dams (other than surety bonds for construction) and that they don't think its a viable business opportunity because the potential losses are so high (liability insurance) and the costs of repair / reconstruction are so high (property insurance). I think it would be very difficult to get them to insure dams. "

Former California Insurance Commissioner








Oroville CAC "Opportunities"

- CAC has baton from Ad Hoc
- Take a leadership role in Proactive Risk Reduction
- Dam is not going to 'fail' tomorrow....BUT
 - Current techniques are deficient
 - Takes decades to implement substantial improvements
 - Aging infrastructure with unknown service life
 - Climate Change
 - Two (2) evacuations in 50 years, statistics says it will happen again!
- Critical to start laying a resilient foundation today!







Recommendations (Mini Projects)

- Re-engage the IFT to review progress on 'lessons to be learned'
- Formalize community impacts for discharges 150,000 cfs to 700,00 cfs
- Explicit definition of 'safety' (what does 'safe' mean?)
- Be financially accountable for "Performance" (Compensation Fund)
- Perform detailed assumption audits (all dam infrastructure)
- Scrutinize Asset Management (not just plans but performance)
 - What is it supposed to do?
 - What is it actually doing?
 - Where are the differences?
 - Use on both physical assets as well as methods/procedures
- Require Life-Cycle Management <u>Today!</u>
 - Target service life
 - Components
 - Assemblies
 - System (where are the 'weak' links?)
 - Target maintenance and intervals
 - Life-cycle based budgeting, then track within expectations or not?




Vagueness of "Failure"

Figure 10. Extended Version of DWR O&M Asset Management Risk Matrix Used in CNA Risk Evaluations

Likelihood Annual Probability		Comprehensive Needs Assessment – Extension of DWR Division of Operations & Maintenance Asset Management Risk Matrix												
		. 1	2	3	4	. 5	- 6	7	8	9	10	11		
		Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	High	Major	Extreme	Catastrophi	c					
times a year	10							-	To	lerable Risk	Guidalina	for		
Likely to occur														
within 1 year	9								: Da	am Safety (L	ife Loss) fr	om FERC		
Likely to occur														
within 3 years	8.5								· an	d other Fed	erai Agenci	es		
1/10 - 1/3	8													
1/30 - 1/10	7.5													
1/100 - 1/30	7													
1/1,000 - 1/100	6													
1/10,000 – 1/1,000	5							~~.						
1/100,000 -	4													
1/10,000														
1/1,000,000 — 1/100,000	3								,					
1/10,000,000 - 1/1,000,000	2													
1/100,000,000 - 1/10,000,000	1													
Negligible														
< 1/100,000,0	00													
Consequence Category		Consequence Level												
		1 2 3 4 5 6						7	7 8 9 10 11					
		Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	High	Major	Extreme	Catastrophi						
Public Safety		No injury	Near miss.			Multiple	0 – 1	1 -10	10 - 100	100 - 1,000	1,000 -	> 10,000		
(including Personnel			minor injuries	Minor injuries	Single injury	injuries, perm.	fatalities	fatalities	fatalities	fatalities	10,000	fatalities		
Safety)			marci injurios			disability	idibilities	icianios			fatalities	racantido		
Financial Impacts (Direct and Indirect)		< \$100k	\$100k · \$1M	\$1M - \$10M	\$10M-\$100M	\$100M - \$1B	\$1B - \$10B	\$10B - 100E	\$100B - \$250B	\$250B - \$500B	\$500B - \$1T	> \$1T		



Failure is Time-Dependent









Limited "Imagination" for Scenarios

Failure Scenarios







Consequences of Failure (Cf)

Less Uncertainty More Uncertainty **Traditional Unfolding Events** Less Uncertainty Quantitative Risk Analysis **Active Flooding** "Probabilities" **Hurricane Aftermath** Well-Structured Well-Defined Bounded BOX I BOX 2 BOX 3 BOX 4 Unanticipated More Uncertainty **Anticipated Events** Unfolding **Events** "Earthquakes" **CRISIS** "1,000 year storm" **III-Structured Un-Defined** "Possibilities" **Un-Bounded**


NEED DIFFERENT TOOLS/METHODS/ STRATEGIES FOR EACH REGION!

Rune Storesund, D.Eng., P.E., G.E., August 2016


Probability of Failure (Pf)











The Johari Window Model



	Known to self (i.e. US Dams)	Not known to self (i.e. US Dams)				
Known to others	PFMA/RIDM	PFMA/RIDM Triangulation Leading Indicators Reliability-Centered Maintenance Resilience Engineering High Reliability Organizations Life-Cycle Management Total Quality Management				
Not known to others	Detailed design calculations Design assumptions Performance characteristics	"Surprises" New Technologies				



Risk Management Pledge

I <u>State Your Name</u> PROMISE TO APPRECIATE THE VALUE AND IMPORTANCE OF UNCERTAINTIES IN CIVIL SYSTEMS. AND HELP DECISION-MAKERS AVOID 'CONFIDENT IGNORANCE' BY ARMING THEM WITH PRAGMATIC INFORMATION AND AVOIDING OVER-SIMPLIFICATION AND E3 ERRORS (SOLVING THE WRONG PROBLEM PRECISELY). I ALSO PROMISE TO TRIANGULATE ANSWERS INSTEAD OF RELYING SOLELY ON ONE TECHNIQUE.



Questions

Dr. Rune Storesund, D.E.ng. P.E., G.E. Executive Director
Center for Catastrophic Risk Management (CCRM)

University of California, Berkeley

rune@berkeley.edu +1 510 225 5389



THE STATE OF DAM SAFETY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES

PRESENTATION TO THE OROVILLE CITIZENS ADVISORY COMMISSION MEETING, 28 MAY 2021

ERIC HALPIN, PE HALPIN CONSULTANTS LLC



- As a US Army Corps of Engineers Infrastructure Leader (1980-2019):
 - Owner and Self Regulator of +3,000 Dam and Levee Systems & Safety Programs
 - Vice Chair of the National Levee Safety Program
 - Primary Interface with Accountability to the Administration, Congress, and the Government "Watch-Dogs"
 - US Government Lead for International Partnerships with Spain, Netherlands, Japan, and United Kingdom on Safety Programs
 - Registered Professional Engineer (1988)
- As Private Consultant: (2018-present)
 - The Same Thing for Clients in Industry



Pulpit Rock, Norway

(2,000 feet above the fiords of Norway)

MY RISKY BACKGROUND IN SAFETY PROGRAMS


01

WHAT CONSTITUTES A STATE-OF- THE ART DAM SAFETY PROGRAM? 02

HOW DO SUSTAIN THE STATE-OF-THE-ART PRACTICE? 03

WHAT TRENDS SHOULD WE BE AWARE OF?

DISCUSSION TOPICS



Good governance never depends upon laws, but upon the personal qualities of those who govern. The machinery of government is always subordinate to the will of those who administer that machinery. The most important element of government, therefore, is the method of choosing leaders.


— Frank Herbert —

AZ QUOTES




TRADITIONAL DAM SAFETY PROGRAM FOCUS (1968-TODAY)

- Compliance withDesign Standards as aMeasure of Safety
- Inspection and Monitoring for Performance Concerns
- Safety Assured by Regulation?



Traditional View of Infrastructure Safety




Focused on How We Built Them, Not How They'll Perform (not integrated systems – think New Orleans)

Focused Compliance with Design Standards as a Measure of Safety, Assured by Regulation

This is what following standards only has resulted in...

- Huge Variation in Risk
- Over and UnderInvestment in RiskManagement
- Wrong Priorities
- Poor Understanding
- o Dynamics!



One Size Doesn't Fit All!



MODERN DAM SAFETY PROGRAM FOCUS (SINCE 2000)

- Understand How Things
 Can Fail and the Risk
 Associated
- Risk Informed Decisions
- Sharing ResponsibilitiesVia ImprovedCommunication
- Governance: People,Process, & Policy




Why is a Strong Risk Framework Necessary?

Integration Via is Credibility:

- Dam Systems and the Environments they exist in are Complex and Dynamic
- Problems that You Can Understand are Problems That Can Be Solved
- Clear Relationships Within Governance: Policies, Processes, and People/Organizations


Built for the Long Haul

- Enduring Across Multiple Generations
- Adaptable to Evolving Practice, Science, Data, and Research



Risk Informed View of Infrastructure Safety

Risk = f(<u>Hazard</u>, <u>Performance</u>, <u>Consequences</u>)




Modern Infrastructure Program: Focused on People, Performance, and Risks




What Shapes Dam Safety Programs?

Safety Programs Constraints:


- Legislation and Regulations
- Technical Policies
- Funding
- State of the Practice



Places Where Risk Informed Safety Programs are the State of the Practice



What Industry Will Extract from the IFT Report



Change

- The "no fail" branch in some event trees can transition to failure in other failure modes*
- Large Damage States are Impactful and can transfer risk within a system*.


Sustain


- Independent Review and Challenge of Past Assessments is Necessary
 - Debate is Encouraged
 - Failure and Incident Rates are Extremely Low, But Industry Always Learns From Them
- Considerations of Systems and Human Factors Is Consistent with (and already a part of) Risk Informed Practice*

* Part of the Federal Risk Review Effort

Key Technical References for Modern Dam Safety Programs


- Guidance documents are the backbone to use of Risk in Dam Safety
- Scalable, but Consistent
- Adaptable, but Equitable
- Employed Broadly in National and International Programs





Assessment

Management & Communication



How Risk Informed Safety Programs Address Complexities

Coincident Loadings

Systems Operations

Breach & Non-Breach Risks

Gate Reliability

Time Dependent Reliability

Length Effects

Regional Events



How Risk Informed Safety Programs Address Human Factors


Reliability Analyses in Hydrologic Loading


Detection and Intervention Impacts in Fragilities

Remote Operations

Issuance of Warning

Evacuation Effectiveness






Gate Reliability Considerations:

- Remote Operations
- Site Access
- Crew Availability
- Gate
 Functionality
- Offsite Power
 Reliability
- Backup Power Reliability

Can Have 1-3
Orders of
Magnitude in Effect
on AEP of Design
Loads (headwater)

Key Mitigating Measures for Human Factors



- Command and Control for Incident Decision Making
- Risk Informed Safety Programs
- Effective Communications and Public Awareness
- Collaboration with Key Stakeholders
- Training and Exercises
- Continuing and Periodic Evaluations
- Qualification Based Roles and Responsibilities








Risk Informed Decision Making Continues to Undergo Adaptive Management



Extreme Events

Understanding their Severity and Likelihood



Industry Bench

Building Capabilities to Support the Action



Systems and Human Factors

Recognizing and Considering Complexity



Governance

Modernizing Approach to People, Decision Processes, and Policies

Common Themes from Complex Incidents



Keep Improving

Sustain Independent Thought

We Need to Be Better

Communicators


It's Rarely About the Numbers

There's a Reason It's Called Civil Engineering

Challenges for Our Industry

- Simplifying Assumptions about System Interactions and Human Factors are Necessary and Appropriate
- o Don't Forsake the Governance Lessons that Have Served Us Well: Safety Programs
- Can We Not Afford to Implement Risk Concepts in Safety Programs?





"Most of the negatives in housing are probably behind us. The fourth quarter should be reasonably good, certainly better than the third quarter."

Alan Greenspan

Overconfidence Bias





"TRUST IS A RISK THAT MASQUERADES AS A PROMISE."



Halpin Consultants LLC

Thank You

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- echalp83@gmail.com



ITEM 6: SPILLWAY CAMERAS



Oroville Spillway WebCam

Oroville Citizen's Advisory Commission

May 28, 2021

John Yarbrough

Webcam view of Thermalito Diversion Pool and Forebay (in distance)



Webcam view of Lake Oroville

Webcam view of Lake Oroville (looking toward Spillway Boat Ramp Cove)

ITEM 7: PUBLIC COMMENT

The Oroville Dam Citizens Advisory Commission will now take public comment.

We appreciate your input.

ITEM 8: ADJOURN

Thank you all for joining us today, our next Oroville Dam Citizens Advisory Commission meeting will be on August 27, 2021.

